

VOL. XXXI NO. 3 SUMMER 1976

International Journal

CANADIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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JEAN-LOUIS ROY

The French fact in North America: Quebec- United States Relations

At various times in their history, Quebecers have been forced to evaluate the conditions of their survival in relation to the existence, recent history, and perceived intentions of the people and government of the United States. For more than three-quarters of a century (1867-1945) their reaction centred largely on an internal debate over the effects of the American giant's existence and influence upon their own society.¹ In numerous instances, they negotiated on an informal basis with American interests in both the public and private sectors, within the general framework provided by the colonial and Canadian situations. But it was accidental if some French-speaking Quebecers were able to play a leading role in the development of Canadian policy towards the United States. With the notable exceptions of the Laurier and Trudeau administrations, the contribution of French Canadians to the elaboration of Canada's foreign policy has been confined to those who were members of the federal cabinet and/or the upper echelon of the civil service. Even in those areas where the Quebec government had some direct involvement and responsibility, Canadian policy was devised with a minimum of provincial consultation and input. Whatever consultative process did exist had no systematic continuity or precise functional definition.

During the past fifteen years, however, Americans have become aware, either from the comments of Canadian politicians or

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¹ Gustave Lanctot, 'Le Québec et les Etats-Unis, 1867-1937,' in *Les Canadiens-Français et leurs voisins du Sud* (Montreal 1941), pp 269-310.

through their own media, of the presence in Canada of a particular problem related to its continued existence as a single political entity. The French fact thus emerged as an international issue. At the same time the Quebec government has been developing a policy designed to establish its presence in the United States. Its political leaders have chosen to put forth their own views of the Canadian crisis and the aspirations of French Quebec. This article strives to explore the underlying aspects of this choice and its consequences.

The study of the Quebecers' international preoccupations since the end of World War II still constitutes a rich field for research. The old hypothesis of Quebec as a closed society, insecure and stifled, severed from the most inventive centres of thought and action on this continent and in Europe, bears little resemblance to the multiple reality that a study of the province's social groups from 1945 to 1960 reveals.² It seems more accurate to suggest that the immediate postwar period was one of transition, that the increase in international contacts during that time was one of the causes of the historical and ideological conflicts that developed and brought in their wake the diverse and rapid changes which marked the first years of the 1960s.

Historical memories should not simply reflect the content of political memory. Quebec society, like all societies, is more extensive and richer than its government which only represents a restricted number of its essential components. The needs, the work, and the aspirations of individuals and groups operating outside the state also contain the seeds of the future. Although the Quebec government has only recently turned its attention to the expansion of its international commitments in response to concrete and pressing needs, numerous non-governmental groups have long sought to communicate with international groups and associations through bilateral and multilateral exchanges. These, in turn, have furnished Quebecers with valuable information and

² Jean-Louis Roy, *Québec, 1945-1960: La Transition* (Montreal 1976 forthcoming).

knowledge. Among the groups involved have been business organizations, trade unions and co-operatives, the universities and the great schools, scientists and intellectuals, the Catholic action movements as well as the professional corporations, and the francophone television and radio structures. The frequency of exchanges has of course varied from one group to another but, in every instance, international links have come to be indispensable: an imperative born of necessity and the need for development.

Except in rare cases the Quebec government was only an observer of this change, not a participant in it. Lacking specialized personnel in the field of intergovernmental relations, still influenced by certain past unfruitful experiences, fearful of possible adverse reactions from the federal government, it chose to abstain from international agreements despite the increasing pressures to do so generated by the demands of cultural development, demographic equilibrium (immigration), the processing of natural resources, and the province's economic and commercial development.

When in the 1960s the Quebec government developed a desire to be the spokesman for a larger segment of the society it represented and endeavoured to respond to the people's needs and desires for change, it discovered that it needed, first and foremost, to ensure its existence as one partner in a federation. Further, it needed to claim recognition as a distinct society among other societies, as a cultural entity among numerous others. If the first of these preoccupations has existed throughout Quebec's political history, the second one was new; this is evident from the demands for organization and the opposition which pursuit of cultural autonomy has created as well as through the choices to be considered and the benefits derived from it.

During the early 1960s, partly in response to tenuous historical precedents, but largely in reaction to the desires engendered by the recent changes in Quebec society, the government of Quebec inaugurated a policy designed to ensure it a timid but

nevertheless real international presence. This policy introduced into the Canadian constitutional debate a new dimension bearing on provincial rights, especially those relating to the exercise by a province of certain prerogatives in the field of international relations. The province invoked the existence of a double Canadian personality: 'One emanating from the fields where the government is competent, the other, from the fields that the constitution designates as provincial privileges.'³ Quebec demanded the exercise, by the Canadian provinces, of a *jus tractatumum*.

The decision to pursue this important matter (which arises in all types of federal states) was reflected in the joint ratification with representatives of the French Republic on 27 February 1965 of an 'understanding between Quebec and France on a programme of exchanges and cooperation in the field of education.' This action was not an attempt to take away the existing powers of the federal government, but rather to determine those of the provinces on a 'practical level.' Quebec was forcing the Canadian federal government to define its position in relation to the rights of the provinces in the international arena.⁴

An analysis of the widespread consequences of these decisions is beyond the scope of this article. I propose, however, to examine the relations which developed between the Quebec government and the United States, its society and its political institutions in the context of these new initiatives.

The analysis of the relations between Quebec and the United

3 See the series of studies commissioned by the Quebec legislature's Parliamentary Committee on the Constitution (established in 1963) and published in 1967: Jacques Brossard, André Patry, and Elizabeth Weiser, *Les pouvoirs extérieurs du Québec* (Montreal 1967); Constitutional Conference, Permanent Committee of Civil Servants. 'Document de travail sur les relations avec l'étranger,' Notes prepared by the Quebec delegation, Quebec, 5 February 1969; also Paul Gérin-Lajoie, Speech to the Consular Corps of Montreal, 12 April 1965, published in *Le Devoir*, 14 and 15 April 1965, and Interview at *Le Devoir*, Paul Gérin-Lajoie, 1 May 1965.

4 The federal position was eventually defined in Paul Martin, *Fédéralisme et relations internationales* (Ottawa 1968).

States constitutes a delicate and difficult exercise. In the first place, the constitutional position of Quebec limits its capacity to maintain official relations with any sovereign state. Diplomatic custom and international law as well as political exigencies have long restricted, if not negated, the possibility of the components of federal states being parties to bilateral and multilateral international treaties.

Secondly, the pragmatic and restrictive position of the Quebec government in the organization of its presence in the great neighbouring federation had prevented, until recently, the enunciation of a governmental policy defining the relations which Quebec wishes to maintain with the United States. Moreover, the American constitution specifically restricts involvement in international relations and foreign policy decisions to the federal administration.

Thirdly, until recently, the negotiations of the Quebec government with the United States, especially with private financial institutions or industrial organizations, were carried out at the highest level, that is by the Prime Minister's Office. These negotiations were semi-private in character. They often depended upon the initiatives of private concerns and involved for the most part the experts of the Departments of Industry and Commerce, Natural Resources, and Finance. They were removed from public scrutiny and their existence was only acknowledged in the announcements of private investments, of government subsidies, or of public spending schemes designed to bolster the growth of the private sector.

Finally Quebec politicians, except as private citizens and only in exceptional circumstances, do not possess the experience which would be acquired through continuous and structured relations with their American colleagues. Only in exceptional instances, as members of Canadian delegations, had some of them participated in the work of international bodies in which American politicians were participating. It was only at the federal level that such bodies as the Canadian-American Ministerial Committee on Shared Defence, the Ministerial Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, the Canada-United States Interparliamentary

Group, and the International Joint Commission provided opportunities for politicians and civil servants to gain experience in dealing with their counterparts in the United States.⁵ In spite of these limitations, the necessities of its economic development and its desire to survive as a francophone corner in North America spurred the Quebec government to define a basic policy towards the United States. To examine the content of this minimum policy, we will look first at the role of the Office of the Prime Minister of Quebec and secondly, the activities undertaken by the Quebec Departments of Industry and Commerce, of Cultural Affairs, and of Intergovernmental Affairs in the 'pragmatic elaboration of the Quebec presence in the United States.'

The lack of systematic studies devoted to the evolution of the functions and responsibilities of the Office of the Prime Minister of Quebec – this sacrosanct area of Quebec power – makes it difficult to analyse in detail the interests, reactions, and interventions of Quebec's prime ministers in relation to the political, social, and economic institutions of American society, to its power of attraction, and to the diversified influence that it has exercised, and continues to exercise, on the development of Quebec. Yet each of Quebec's prime ministers in the postwar era, whether through necessity or sheer political opportunism, recognized in his own way the importance of this republican giant and its perception of Quebec society.

As early as 1940, Prime Minister Godbout had brought a new dimension to Quebec-United States relations with his decision to establish a Quebec Government House in New York City. Godbout's personal interest in Quebec House and the activities of its agent general demonstrated his sensibility to the spectacular rise of the United States as a political, industrial, and military giant, as an international reservoir of capital for both the private and the public sectors, and as a primary world market. With discre-

⁵ See Senate, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs*, 29th Parl, 2nd sess, no 1, 28 March 1974, annex II: List of Canada-United States Intergovernmental Bodies.

tion and consistency, he followed and encouraged the first steps of the House, and he became its privileged and attentive spokesman.

Maurice Duplessis, when he took power in 1944, put aside his original reservations and assured the agent general in New York City of his confidence in the latter's endeavours. However, it is clear that he was basically insensitive to the concept of Quebec House. Its supporters sought a clear mandate, a more systematic programme, and greater resources but despite discreet pressure from the agent general, little was done. The Duplessis government did use the House as its official agent to the Securities Exchange Commission. As far as other activities were concerned, the neglect of Quebec House allowed it a certain autonomy to take initiatives in the sectors concerned with industrial promotion, the introduction of Quebec products in American markets, and tourism, but the extent of these activities was restricted by the lack of financial resources.

Nor did the Duplessis government make many demands on Quebec House with regard to official missions. Though Duplessis was in constant negotiation with American interest groups, he chose to give his trips to New York a private character. He never sought to address an audience as would become the norm under the Lesage régime, nor did he ever expose himself to questioning by the American press. Nevertheless, a careful reading of his speeches and correspondence shows that he had a definite interest in certain events in the political and judicial life of the United States. The ideological debates which mobilized the attention of the American social and political spheres during the postwar period constituted a reservoir of images and ideas which inspired Prime Minister Duplessis. It is clear that being even modestly in the 'right' camp during the immense struggle which opposed the forces of darkness against those of light was a pressing duty.

The style and content of the declarations that Jean Lesage made on his trips across the border were among the innovations that brought a new importance to Quebec-United States relations in the 1960s. Lesage broke resolutely with the private and in-

formal style which had characterized Duplessis' New York visits. Every trip involved private meetings, but also public appearances and even general statements on Quebec policies. Thus, in February 1962, Lesage spoke to the Canadian Society of New York before an audience of more than four hundred, and was also the guest of honour at the annual New York reception of the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce to which American industrialists and financiers had been invited, many 'of whom represent[ed] substantial interests in the Province of Quebec.'

To the Canadian Society of New York, Lesage emphasized the significance of the event: 'It is not often that a Prime Minister of the Province of Quebec is given an opportunity such as this to meet with some of the leading members of New York's financial community. As a matter of fact, I am told that this is the first time that this has ever happened.' He then proceeded to give a remarkable outline of the political and social objectives 'of the people and government of Quebec': 'The citizens of Quebec are speaking out, expressing themselves, stating their opinions, talking things over, and are working together to find solutions to their common problems.' In this context, the Quebec government had to accomplish the objectives of a new mandate, 'to establish a new way of life.' The means to be used in accomplishing this vast undertaking were numerous; those which Lesage enumerated as fundamental would lead to the most spectacular future accomplishments of his government. He believed foreign investment to be necessary to social and economic development as well as to the creation of a processing industry for Quebec's natural resources. Never before in the American metropolis had anyone so clearly stated the existence of a Quebec community by recreating, with vigour and pride, its desire and willingness to outline the conditions of its modernization.

In October 1963 Prime Minister Lesage was in Philadelphia to receive the award of merit from the prestigious Public Personnel Association and on this occasion he reiterated for his American audience the essential elements of his speech to the Canadian Society of New York and stressed the radical change that the

public service was undergoing in Quebec. The following month before the Congress of the North American Securities Administration, Mr Lesage outlined the monetary support Quebec needed to finance its socio-economic development and assured the financiers that in associating themselves with the Quebec projects, they could expect 'just and fair treatment,' a theme he had first dealt with before the National Association of Insurance Commissioners of the United States when it met in Montreal in June 1962. In 1963 the Prime Minister provided a concrete demonstration of his programme by convincing the directors of the First Boston Corporation to lend the province more than \$300 million to allow it to nationalize all the private electrical utility companies operating in Quebec.

In November 1963, Lesage also made a trip to Louisiana where according to an official communiqué, 'he has been able to realize the persistence of the French fact in this state.'

The subsequent year, when receiving an honorary degree from Dartmouth College, Jean Lesage again invoked the sense of community among Quebecers and underlined the extent of the transformations which were affecting their society, stating that 'the only important institution with which the French-Canadian minority has a real contact is the Quebec government.' 'The maximum utilization of this institution has upset the existing interior environment, while it risks moreover to upset the Canadian constitutional framework. However the net result of these alterations is that all our country, as well as all of North America will be able to benefit from the contribution of the French Canadians to North American civilization.' In short, then, Lesage stated that in stressing a desire to maintain its cultural uniqueness Quebec did not mean that the province was attempting to dissociate itself from the rest of North America; rather it sought to integrate itself even more fully, once it had acquired a greater sense of security.

Daniel Johnson continued the style inaugurated by his predecessor. As well as having private discussions and negotiations, he

also met numerous groups as the agenda of his New York trip in November 1967 demonstrates. Aside from giving speeches to the members of the Council on Foreign Relations and to the Calvin Bullock Forum, the Prime Minister met the members of the Canadian Society of New York and of the New York Financial Writers Association.

The purpose of Johnson's first trip is clearly revealed in the 1966-7 annual report of Quebec House in New York: 'Therefore it was of the utmost importance that, soon after his coming to power, the new Prime Minister of Quebec come along with his chief advisers, to meet in New York, the important American personalities who have a deep impact upon the formulation of American financial policies and who, in the last analysis, set the ratings for Quebec. The sole presence in New York of the Prime Minister of Quebec, his defense of the principles that his government promotes, demonstrated determination, won over many sympathies and contributed to consolidating confidence, in American circles, in the economic and political stability of Quebec.'

The circumstances surrounding the New York trip of Daniel Johnson were not very encouraging. As a result of a certain confusion concerning the constitutional objectives pursued by the new Quebec government and the prolonged absences of the head of government for health reasons, questions had been asked in certain circles concerning the stability of the new administration. And the value of real estate as well as of stocks traded by the most important Quebec companies on the Montreal Stock Exchange had fallen drastically. Before his departure for New York, Mr Johnson attempted to ease these apprehensions by appointing Marcel Faribault, president of General Trust of Canada, to the position of chief economic and constitutional adviser to the government, and by meeting with the leaders of the Montreal financial community to clarify for their benefit the constitutional positions of his administration.

In New York, the information officer at Quebec House drew up a list of questions which made 'our American friends' uneasy

and which the Prime Minister should therefore take into account in preparing his New York appearances. This list might be summarized as follows.

While not truly believing that the province of Quebec would opt for independence, the financial community is concerned about the political consequences of such a move. An independent state of Quebec would lose the security provided by the Canadian judicial, political, and military structures. An independent Quebec would have to behave according to strict norms, in particular it would have to create a new monetary system and a stable currency. Moreover, the American financial community is worried about the implications of Franco-Quebec relations, particularly after the departure of General de Gaulle, largely because in pursuing its new friendship with France, Quebec seems to be turning away from old friends such as the United States. Although the Americans understand the desire of Quebecers to speak their own language, the House's information officer cautions that Quebec's insistence on giving the French language first place may be misinterpreted by the Americans as the reflection of 'a mental attitude demonstrating the absence of a willingness and of a comprehension to use all the advantages in the commercial and industrial sectors. Quebec must be aware that it is in competition with the rest of the world in these sectors. It will not accomplish anything significant by retreating into its "French cocoon."'

It is difficult to know whether or not this memorandum was ever seen by Prime Minister Johnson. For reasons difficult to pinpoint, the promoter of 'equality and independence' who played such a fundamental role in Canadian political life does not seem to have had much impact across the border. Johnson's public speeches held little of significance for the pragmatic and worried audiences who greeted him. He presented them with long and dry dissertations on the Canadian constitutional crisis and, afterwards, answered in an offhand manner (the reverse of his proverbial good humour), the most serious questions that the participants asked him. From a reading of his speeches and of the press reports on his visit, it would appear that Daniel Johnson and his advisers

sought to use the New York visit as a means of reading the Canadian public rather than for pursuing relations with the United States. The importance which was attached to the presence in New York of English-Canadian reporters and mass media bears out this interpretation.

By choosing to encourage Quebec's links with the United States since it came to power in 1970, the Bourassa government has demonstrated its deep interest in the expansion of its commercial and financial links with its powerful southern neighbour, though it is still too early to evaluate the impact of its activities. Following the tradition of his predecessors, Robert Bourassa has made frequent trips to the United States. These visits have almost always been public in character, if not designed for media exposure.

Bourassa's first visit occurred under exceptional circumstances. A few hours before his departure, British diplomat James Cross was kidnapped in Montreal. It was the beginning of a profound crisis which was to divide the Quebec nation and in New York the events taking place in Quebec gave a certain unforeseen topicality to the Bourassa visit. The Prime Minister held private meetings with groups of financiers, appeared at annual dinners of different organizations and social clubs, gave press conferences, met politicians such as Mayor Lindsay and Governor Rockefeller as well as a few high civil servants in the American federal administration.

The first visit of Robert Bourassa to New York followed the established pattern whereby the new head of the government of Quebec personally makes contact with all the directors of the American financial institutions which have lent considerable sums of money to the government. Committed through his electoral promises to a programme of economic growth and convinced that his political future and the stability of Quebec required massive investments, Prime Minister Bourassa outlined for his audiences the substantial changes which Quebec society had already undergone. He pointed to the great energy needs of the continent and sketched for his listeners the impressive potential of the James

Bay drainage basin. Although he reiterated the necessity of protecting the majority's language rights, Bourassa did not repeat Daniel Johnson's mistake of discussing Canadian constitutional matters; instead he concentrated on the state of Quebec's public finances, of the potential which Hydro-Quebec represented, and of the investment possibilities in his province.

If his first trip was oriented towards the investors, Bourassa's second visit to New York in March 1971 was aimed specifically at the lenders. He took advantage of his stay to inaugurate the Quebec exhibit at the Fourth Annual Institutional Investor Conference which brought together in New York more than 300 investment consultants. The well-orchestrated presence of Quebec at this conference was the most important manifestation of industrial promotion ever organized by a provincial government. In his meetings with eventual lenders, the Prime Minister outlined the financial needs of the Quebec government if it was to develop the hydroelectric resources of James Bay and pursue its other objectives during a period of decreasing revenues due to the continued economic slowdown. Anxious to obtain favourable responses from the lenders, the Prime Minister tried to dissipate the potential doubts born of the October crisis and to clarify the intentions of his administration in the area of linguistic policy. Later in the year, en route to the Victoria constitutional conference, Bourassa stopped over in San Francisco to meet representatives of the Bank of America in order 'to obtain for Quebec a portion of the American investment capital in the West.'

The Prime Minister was back in New York once again in September 1974. The speech which he gave on 16 September to the members of the Council on Foreign Relations constituted a detailed and frank response to the worries of the audience. If the separation of Quebec and 'the creation of a separate and autonomous state is an option that a great majority of Quebecers reject, the alternative is 'the constitution of a decentralized Canadian federalism and the creation of the instruments necessary to insure the cultural protection and the development of Quebec.' The Prime Minister sought to explain to his audience the foundation

of the concept of cultural sovereignty and its consequences in relation to 'the safeguard and the development of the predominant language and of culture in Quebec.' Seeking to appease certain fears, he explained at length the linguistic policy of his government as embodied primarily in bill 22 (the Official Language Act). On the economic level, the Prime Minister stated that Quebec must orient its policies so as to give preference to its own investments, as well as to foreign investments beneficial to the Quebec economy. He invited American businessmen to 'really live the life' of the community, to integrate themselves in Quebec by ensuring 'the increasing advancement of the members of the collectivity which have the competence to fill decision making posts in companies, the implantation of secondary industries and the reinvestment of profits.' In short, they must adapt themselves to the will of Quebecers which is 'to become an integral element of the dynamism which animates the North American nations while keeping its indispensable cultural identity.'

Quebec House, which was established in 1940 and inaugurated in 1943, has been the most important and consistent Quebec presence in the United States. Even though the delegate general and his staff do not have diplomatic privileges or official rights, they possess a *de facto* semi-diplomatic status and are recognized as a privileged spokesman for Quebec in discussions with governmental or private American decision-makers. Nor have American authorities ever sought to impose any restrictions on the Quebec representatives, as long as they did not seek to 'institutionalize' their links with American decision-makers.

The work of Quebec House has been continuously limited, however, by the lack of resources at its disposal. It is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness and the profitability of the services which it offered to Quebecers who, as individuals or as administrators and exporters, solicited its assistance and to the Americans who attempted to discover what conditions awaited them if they decided to invest in the province of Quebec. But the annual reports of Quebec House testify to sustained activity in this area.

Whether it concerns the establishment of contacts with American investors, the study of industrial development projects, or simple industrial development schemes, the numbers are impressive. Concurrent with these aims, Quebec House also sought to find new markets for Quebec products. Pursuit of this goal has been especially important since 1960 and led in 1970 to the creation of a special commerce centre. Quebec House also functions as an intermediary between the government of Quebec, the municipal corporations, and the school boards, and American loan companies. The delegate general, moreover, participates in all the bargaining sessions.

In spite of repeated demands, the funds necessary to ensure the development of vigorous cultural and information services as well as the maintenance of existing initiatives such as the appearances of Jeunesses Musicales in the United States and the promotion of Quebec films across the border have been inadequate and the success of Quebec House efforts in these sectors has not been as great as one might have hoped.

Thus, Quebec House has limited itself basically to the promotion of industry and commerce, though it has of course played a significant role in the development of the tourist industry in Quebec.

Aside from the Prime Minister's Office, the three government departments which have exercised a certain responsibility in the international relations sector are the Departments of Industry and Commerce, Cultural Affairs, and Intergovernmental Affairs.⁶

The responsibility for Quebec House in New York had fallen to the Department of Industry and Commerce in 1940 and thus it had an early involvement in relations with the United States. The growth of activities in this sector led, in 1962, to the organization of a secretariat responsible for the various Quebec overseas delegations. Its main function was to centralize the requests for

⁶ As well, the Department of Education has engaged in co-operative efforts with the provinces of New Brunswick and Ontario and with the state of Louisiana. See its annual report for 1969-70.

information coming from the agencies and to direct them to the appropriate departmental sections.⁷ Its work has grown until it is now involved in the general administration for the various Quebec offices abroad, in interministerial co-ordination, and in relations with the private sector. The opening in 1969 of offices in Boston, Chicago, Dallas, and Los Angeles was a concrete demonstration of the efforts made by the secretariat's section of the external relations to search for new external markets 'by putting special emphasis upon the American market.'

At its inception the Department of Cultural Affairs stated its intention to focus its attention upon North American francophone minorities. Having resolved certain problems dealing with the definition of its tasks and the recruitment of its personnel, the Minister of Cultural Affairs created a section responsible for French-speaking North Americans residing outside Quebec. Until the appointment of the section head on 1 September 1963, the minister and deputy minister personally represented the Quebec government among the francophone minorities in Canada and the United States.

The first preoccupation of the section was to undertake 'an inventory of what constituted francophone North America' before elaborating short-term and long-term programmes. Projects of 'cultural expansion among the francophone groups of the continent' and direct links with the organizations which represented them were strengthened by the more frequent presence of the minister or his representatives amongst American francophone groups, by a modest policy of grants, by the definition of research programmes with various American organizations,⁸ and by the setting up of committees: Quebec-Vermont, Quebec-Louisiana.

7 Department of Industry and Commerce, annual report (French version) 1963, p 49.

8 Department of Cultural Affairs, annual report, 1964. See especially the inquiry of the 'Foreign Research Project' concerning the survival of second languages of minority groups in the United States and the inventory project 'of the cultural wealth that Franco-Americans keep in archival records, books and important documents and even works of art in order to establish a conservation and utilization plan for these precious objects.' Department of Cultural Affairs, annual report, 1969-70.

Between 1963 and 1970 the minister visited five American states while the deputy minister and the section head responsible for the French-speaking North Americans residing outside Quebec made frequent visits to all the American states where francophone groups exist. During the same period, the department subsidized the activities of a few private organizations: ethnic associations, professional associations, cultural centres, newspapers, publishing houses, educational centres, radio stations.

By invoking 'the changes which have occurred in the relations between Quebec and the rest of the world,' the Quebec National Assembly approved on 14 April 1967 a law which transformed the Department of Federal-Provincial Affairs into the Department of Intergovernmental Affairs. According to the department's annual report in 1968, 'the chief goal of this change was to officially centralize under the same department, the administration of all relations between Quebec and the other Canadian governments as well as abroad.' Henceforth this new department was responsible for relations between Quebec and other governments as well as international organizations and for intergovernmental agreements to which Quebec is a signatory. The department was also responsible for the delegates general of Quebec. All the personnel in foreign Quebec delegations were transferred to the new department except for advisory members of delegations who continue to be responsible to their respective departments. As a result, Quebec House in New York went from the jurisdiction of the Department of Industry and Commerce to that of the international relations section of the new department, as did the offices in Chicago, Boston, Dallas, and Los Angeles and in Louisiana.

The France-Quebec relationship has, it seems, occupied most of the attention and taken up most of the resources of the new department. The relations between Quebec and the United States have, nonetheless, increased due to the opening of commercial offices, to the visits of the ministers of industry and commerce and of intergovernmental affairs to New York and Chicago in

1969, and even to the hopes brought about by the appointment of General Jean-Victor Allard as 'delegate of Quebec to the United States,' to quote the 1969-70 report of the Department of Intergovernmental Affairs.

One of the most pressing tasks to which the department will have to turn its attention consists of sorting out the confused and complex record which emerges from the agreements and understandings signed or assented to by the government of Quebec with American states. Roger Swanson, in his study for the State Department,⁹ has found nearly eighty such occurrences. Quebec has made agreements with twenty-three American states in sixteen different sectors. This statistic demonstrates more cross-border activity than might have been suspected. These agreements, concluded in a sectoral fashion throughout the last century, are not part of an over-all plan or the outgrowth of a definite policy. They demonstrate, nonetheless, that Quebec is an integral part of the North American continent and that this integration is linked to motives based on a basic desire to survive and to grow.

⁹ *State/Provincial Interaction: A Study of Relations between U.S. States and Canadian Provinces* (August 1974).

Mosaic versus melting pot?: immigration and ethnicity in Canada and the United States

Many Canadians believe that Canada's experience with ethnicity at the level of both social attitudes and social reality, has been different from that of the United States. This difference is often envisioned as one between a Canadian mosaic, where ethnic groups have maintained their distinctiveness while functioning as part of the whole, and an American melting pot, where peoples of diverse origins have allegedly fused to make a new people. There is, of course, some truth to this distinction, but it oversimplifies both the American and the Canadian experiences. It ignores the fact that the mosaic approach has not always been the prevailing attitude toward immigrant adjustment in Canada, it obscures the fact that Canada and the United States have shared very similar immigration policies (particularly on the question of which ethnic, national, and racial groups were the most desirable), and it neglects the fact that, at least with regard to immigrant groups, the history of racism, nativism, and discrimination has been very similar in the two countries.

In comparing the American and Canadian experiences with immigration and ethnicity, the focus of this paper is on immigration policy, nativist (or anti-foreign) sentiment, and public attitudes toward immigrant adjustment, rather than on the degree to which immigrant ethnic groups have survived as distinct cultural entities within the two societies. An examination of public attitudes toward ethnic minorities reveals basic assumptions about

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